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Hum srous books and thousands of articles have been written 
about t e New Deal, its aims, objectives, and leaders. It is 
likely that all of the material that has been written has been 
the out-spoken thoughts of the various writers. Much of the 
material has been criticism both constructive and destructive, 
that is to say some of the suggestions that have been offered 
if put into practice would have been helpful while others would 
have been detrimental. 
The material that has been cous ructive has been the result 
of careful thought on the part of the writer, while the other has 
hot. That constructive material which I have found has been classi­
fied as scientific and therefore as reliable and useful. 
Although scientific material has been mther difficult to ob­
tain, it has been the aim of the writer to use only that material 
which, in the main, has been written for scientific reasons with 
a logical approach. Hie author will not attempt to criticize or 
put forth new policies that would alleviate the economic pressure 
that is bearing upon the nation, but only to collect and preserve 
in a simple yet factual manner some of the monetary policies that 
have been experimented with and placed in practice during the life 
of the New Deal. 
Chapter I 
Economic Causes of the New Deal 
A - The Depression 
The existing state of economic strain has not always existed, 
nor is it likely that it will continue forever. Depressions, it 
has been discovered by eminent economists, are only phases of great 
business cycles and that due to the imperfections in our economic 
structure they are nearly regular occurences. According to Professor 
Lionel D. Edie, Professor of Finance, University of Chicago - "Busi­
ness Cycle" is a phrase used to designate the series of changes in 
business activity which are characterized by alternating prosperity 
and depression. The phrase serves to emphasize the observed fact 
that the typical condition in business is not permanent prosperity. 
Instead, it is a constant series of changes - from prosperity to 
crisis, from crisis to depression, rom depression to recovery, 
from recovery back to prosperity again. This succession of c anges 
is not exceptional or unusual, but is the eustomary and e3q)ected 
round of business behavior. Then business is at a peak of good 
times, it is on the verge of depression. Then business is in the 
slough of despond, it is on the threshold of recovery. Ebb and flow 
between good times and bad times is the essential charateristic of 
the business cycle. 
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However, the ups and downs of business do not occur with the 
exact regularity with which a pendulum swings back and forth* No 
two business cycles are of exactly the same duration. No two cycles 
have exactly the same rise and fall of prices of production. No 
two cycles have exactly the same background of fundamental economic 
conditions. Each cycle has an individuality of its own. Neverthe­
less, in spite of all such individual differences and variations 
all cycles run true to type. They follow well defined lines of 
general bet&vior. They have fundamental forces. The individual 
peculiarities of each cycle exist within limitB clearly defined by 
the basic common characteristics of all cycles. Two errors are 
equally to be avoided; the one, exaggeration of the notion that a 
cycle runs sterotyped, fixed, and absolutely periodic courses; the 
other, exaggeration of the notion that the ups and downs of business 
are chaotic or haphazard phenomena which obey no general laws.^ 
It is quite plain from the above observations that our present 
depression is not the first nor the last of periodic occurences. 
Nor is it possible for the present economic disorder to last with­
out recover returning. So with the knowledge that the depression 
is only one phase of the economic order and that money is likely 
to fluctuate during the phase, we can see clearly the problem of 
attempting to stabalize the fluctuations of money and at the same 
time woik toward recovery. A brief review of the depression will 
Lionel D. Sdie, Economics: Principles and Problems, 
(Thomas Y. Crowell Co., New York - 1926) p. 579 Vol. 1 
bring vividly before us the almost sudden eImage from economic se­
curity to economic insecurity. 
"Let us begin with a bird's eye-view of the United tates in 
the spring of 1929. From that pleasant elevation we see farmers 
working in their fields. i ome are ploughing, digging and cultivating; 
others are spraying orchards or herding cattle and sheep. Later we 
see th«a gathering their cro )s and herds and shipping them to market, 
e note the farmers making frequent trips to town and emerging from 
the general stores with numerous bags and bundles. e note also the 
automobile of the rural free delivery bringing numerous packages, 
presumably from the mil order houses. The farm produce is brought 
by wagon and trucks to the railroad and presently we see long freight 
trains creeping over land to distant cities. <Te see factories, mills 
and mines, and men converging toward thai each morning. a see trains 
and trucks bringing raw materials and other trucks and trains carry­
ing away cases of the finished goods. These c^ees go to distributing 
centers; they are distributed to stores of ell kinds and we perceive 
the working men going to these stores and returning with aimfuls of 
packages. Almost everyone i3 busy and though few seem to be supply­
ing solely their own needs, all seem to get some share of the things 
which their neighbors are so busy making. 
From our aerial vantage point, of eourse, e cannot discern the 
green and white papers that make this exchange possible. It mi^ht 
seam to us like sorae gigantic schane of cooperation or barter. 
Sveryone seems to be bus ing himself in one fashion or another and 
to receive a widespread assortment of goods. There is to be sure 
much activity which seerus from our lofty position like so ;uch aim-
4. 
less running about. But we nay assume that it has some relation to 
the whole business of making and exchanging goods. 
Then one day in the autumn of 1929 we notice a * reat commotion 
in one of the larger eastern cities. People scurry back and forth 
in its narrow streets in great frenzy. The focus of all this commo­
tion is a few little white buildings at the top of a narrow island. 
Soon the factory smoke ceases, man turn sadly away and we see 
them gathering around employment bureaus, lounging in city paries 
and finally standing for hours in bread lines. The fermers, too go 
listlessly about their work. Fields go unharvested, orchards un­
picked. Railroad trains are shorter and less frequent. The con­
struction of office buildings, hotels and apartment houses gradually 
grow less. This is accompanied by reduced activity in steel mills 
and locomotive works. As one group of factories suspend and its 
discouraged employees drifting to beg for work and food we see other 
factories which were supplying these people with gpoAa lay off aa-
(1)  
ployees and at length shut down." 
The above paragraphs describe in a picturesque yet simple and 
truthful manner the beginning of the depression. To put the picture 
more clearly before us, let us examine figures and percentages com­
piles by F. C. Mills and Simon Knuznets. "Between the years 1929 
and 1932 the total physical output of goods in the country had been 
reduced 37 per cent; total labor income in all industries had de­
clined 40 per cent, dividends had dropped 57 per cent but interest 
U)l . Hucker, A Short History of the Hew Deal (The Macmillan Co., 
New York) 1933. p. 18. 
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had dropped only 3 per cent. The seasonally adjusted index of 
Industrial production(in terms of 19r3-25 as 100) in Parch stood 
at 59, that of construction at 14, that of factory payrolls at 37 
(unadjusted), and that of freight car loadings at 50; the farmers 
dollar in the form of purchasing power, was worth 50 cents." ^ 
With factories idle, farm products bringing low prices and 
every other field of endeavor closed unemployment quickly rose and 
thus another link in our economic chain was broken. With such 
impetus the depression gained headway rapidly. 
B - Une iploy ent as an Sconoiaic Cause 
With unemployment gaining headway so rapidly it became im­
possible for the neighborhood to deal with the problem and orga­
nized relief became prevalent in all of the cities and towns in 
factory areas. In March 1933 according to data compiled by the 
National Bureau of Economic Research, between 13 and 20 million 
people were unalloyed in the United States and each year since 
than the number has steadily increases. 
Stuart Chase, says of the incident, "In the early months of 
1932 a squadron of five hundred investigators for the Htoergsncy 
elief Bureau of New York, made a house to house survey of 6,304 
families in the city. None of the cases were known to any family 
elfare society, being too ignorant or too proud to apply for orga-
* x 
nized relief, but all were narked "urgent." Th© chief breadwinner 
^Horace Taylor, at. al., Contemporary Problems (Harcourt, race 
4 Co., New York 19. 4-35 ed.) Vo. I. p. 4. 
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had been unemployed from four months to two years with an average 
of eight months. The following somber figures tabulate the results 
of the investifation:-
5,122 families - 81 per cent of all lacked food. 
5,516 families - 88 per cent were in arrears on 
rent. 
2,387 families - 38 per cent lacked winter 
clothing. 
Shoes were being stuffed with playing c rds 
for soles; children were too cold and too 
shabby to go to school. 
1,576 families - 25 per cent were seriously 
short of fuel; scraps wore being collected on 
the streets. 
3,976 families - 63 per cent were in arrears on 
life insurance premiums. Host of the families 
were in debt for more t-an $500.00, The average 
debt was $224.00. 
74 per cent borrowed from telatives or friends. 
50 per cent of those having life insurance 
borrowed the full surrender value. 
25 per cent showed saving*s bank paBa books, 
with the accounts closed. 
50 per cent were eking out eaci stance on food 
baskets obtained irregularly from those relief 
agencies which do not investigate their; cases. 
1,500 families sold or pawned furniture to buy 
food. 
A large percentage of the families reported 
discouragement, bitterness, and in many cases 
t e breaking up of the home, as children could 
hot be cared for. (1) 
The picture described by those data above is indeed dark and 
( 1 )  
Stuart Chase, A Hew Deal (The Kaciailian Co., New York, 1932) 
p. 111-112. 
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dreary and to think that it repr senta only a small number of the 
cases in New York alone, makes one visualize the iwnanne magnitude 
of the problem. This large number of unemployed people has been the 
result of the closing of factories, manufacturing plants and other 
industrial producing agencies throughout the nation. Lack of suffi­
cient capital on the part of the employers and others who carry on 
their producing with infested and borrowed capital, has been the 
renson for their closing. The public on the other hand has not been 
able to buy their products because of the low purchasing power of 
the dollar, and the apparent closing of the channels throu^i which 
money circulates. In a capitalistic system ouch as ours the inter­
relation of the producer to the consumer Is so finloy "woven" to­
gether that the least bit of pressure on either is likely tohave a 
devastating effect. And this has been the case in our system result­
ing in the millions we have unemployed. 
As earefree as the American public has been or is supposed to 
be it cannot withstand the constant cry of hungry men, women and 
c ildren; of its gigantic factories idle and silend or its money 
and securities idle in closed banks, thus the depression and unem­
ployment have both been economic causes of the New Deal. 
C. - Our Banking Dilemma 
Due to the depression, as a main re-ason, our banking structure 
had folded or collapsed completely. "At first gradually, soon with 
increasing intensity, the banking system of the country began to sag, 
then to collapse. The initial signs of disaster were visible in 
8 
Detroit when the leading banks closed; this was followed by the estab-
1 shownt on February 14 of a state wide moratorium for eight days. 
But t e banks never reopened and by ! arch 2, there were twenty-one 
states and the District of Columbia which had to Join Michigan, either 
\sy.. 
in suspending or in closely restricting banking opera tios. The 
Federal Reserve system reported widespread hoax-ding. On the eve of 
Roosevelt's inauguration the panic had reached the greatest financial 
nerve centers of the nation, New York and Chicago, with the result 
that the governors of New York and Illinois had announced banking 
holida s. The day of the new President's acception into the office 
saw banking operations practically at a standstill in every state 
i the union with all security and comodity exchanges closed." W 
Thus was our banking structure struggling under duress that its own 
presidents, directors and state officials could not solve. 
The depression and all of the factors in our economic set-up 
effected by it made it necessary for changes or the inception of new 
ideas if our economy was to regain its feet. Roosevelt, his aides 
and a visors gave birth to the idea of the New Deal and it was put 
into practice. 3o the New Deal has been the new adminietrations 
a swer to the problems that confronted them. 
TTTT— 
Hacker, A dhort . toiy of the New Deal. (F. S. Cobb, 1934, 
New Yoik) p. 19. 
Chapter !!• 
Tfrmlrtreg aad the SMF Deal 
Xbrott h gradual evolution t> c business of hanking hoc uo» 
voleped a ccsnplex and confusing ©filiation of epoeialised types* 
each devoting itself largely to tie performance of see® control or 
rectrictod function# As the groT*~t.~h of tiio oO's^cHiilo syateSii I pi s ro*» 
vcaled t o possibility of" end supposed ::eed for nso or ieprmred 
klnde of hanking* a mm and specialised typo of banking usually 
has been created to sseet the supposed seed*  ̂ And so it ic that 
bonks and business are inseparably ciod together and eeoh is do-
pendent upon the other for its life* It is therefore of riajor to-
pertassee tint bosks sstst be kept is the best of Wftlir condition 
if business is to progress* 
A - Coa/rressiorjal A. ciqn • .-..r-' hnaktog 
On the day of tlie President* s inaugural nearly one half of 
the states hod deolarod a btmkin holiday in, a local atteespt to 
tfesnrt the crisis that tsas confronting than* It w iianediateXy 
nooc. cary for the Federal GoveimaDnt to take a hand to &zo aattor 
and attaapt to solve the problea* la an attaapt to clear up the 
banking situation* President Roosevelt ist-ued the following order— 
•gheroae it is in the best interest of all bank depositors 
tint a period of respito be provided v/itli a vie?/ of pro* 
7TT* 
•<altcr E* Spohr* Peonocdc Principles and Problems* (lb© 
Mocraillan Co. 1034) n» 4? ?. Vol 1# 
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venting further hoarding of coin, bullion or currency 
or speculation in foreign exchange and permitting the 
application of appropriate measures to protect the 
interest of our people — 
HOB1 therefore I, Franklin D. Noosevelt, President of 
the United States of /; ;erica, in view of such national 
emergency and by virtue of the authority vested in me by 
said Act and in order to prevent the export hoarding or 
earmarking of gold or silver coin, or bullion or currency, 
do hereby proclaim, order, direct ard declare that frcan. 
Monday, the sixth day of March, Nineteen. Hundred and Thirty 
Throe, both dates inclusive, there shall be maintained and 
observed by all banking institutions and all branches thereof 
located in the United States of America, including the terri­
tories and insular possesions, a bank holiday, and that dur­
ing said pperiod all banking transactions shall be suspen­
ded."*1* 
The order cited above was the President's first move 
toward banking recovery. His next act was the drafting of the 
ihiargency Banking Act. "The Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney 
General and I were engaged with members of the Senate and House of 
representatives in the preparation of the Emergency Banking Act* I 
s u p p o s e  a t  l e a s t  a  d o z e n  d i f f e r e n t  d r a f t s  w e r e  e d i t e d  a n d  r e - e d i t e d . " ( 2 )  
(1)Eorace Tayl or, et. al. (Contemporary Problems) arc ourt Braco Co. 
New York, 1934. p. 153. 
(2)F. D. Eoosovelt, Chi Our bay. The John Day Co., Hew York, 1934. 
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"The special session of the Seventy-Third Congress was hurried­
ly convened to enact the adminstrators emergency banking bill - a 
measure that was introduced, passed and signed in a single day, 
March 9, 1933, One of the last official acts of the same Congress 
was to pass the Glass-Steagill banking bill, officially designed 
the Banking A^t of 1933; this received the President's signature 
on Juno 16• An amendment to the Emergency Bank Act, which was 
approved March 24, authorising the Federal Reserve Banks to make 
direct loans to no-member banks and trust companies during the ex-
is tin emergency, can be properly included in the first law#51 (*•) 
Thus did the President and Congress act quickly to put the bank­
ing machinery Imck in -working order and regain, confidence# "The 
kn ention of the Emergency Banking Bill was simple j it ms de­
signed to permit the sound banks to reopen and to furnish them 
with currency for the purpose of liquefying t eir assests. Its 
ijore important sections provided; that additional Federal Reserve 
Bank Motes were to be issued to member bonks up to 100 per cent 
of the other rediseounted assests, that is to say, notes, drafts, 
bills of exchange and bankers acceptances; that the open market 
operations of the Federal Reserve Bank were to be enlarged by-
permitting them to lend to any persons or corporations notes 
secured by government bonds; that rational and state banks which 
ivere members of the Federal Reserve System could reopen aly under 
( ^Horace Taylor, et# Contemporary Problems, (Hare our t Brace 
Co., Hew York, 1934) p# 153. " 
12 
lisccn.se from the Treasury (basks sot entirely solvent were to 
be placed under the cont rol of conservators and could be operated 
only under restrictions)! that the Secretary of tie Treasury could 
call in gold certificates in the country! and the S©construction 
Finance Corporation was to be authorised subscribe to the preferred 
stock, capital notes and debentures of banks and trust ccaupanies."(l) 
1MB is a sunniary of the important features of the Banking Act. 
As helpful as the act MAY have been intended to be it LAS not BO. 
J. T. Flyna in an article titled ''banting Eeal Banking Eeform," 
saus - "The fundamental organic disease which afflicted our banks 
w© ignored almost wholly. Instead ve prescribed a iialf dozen 
poulticies and lotions and one powerful narcotic. Under the guise 
of banning one very vicious type of affiliate we legalised a whole 
flock of equally dangerous other kinds of affiliations. We extended 
branch banking without providing any safegaurds against its abuse. 
We literally, for the first time, expressly legalised and establis ed 
holding com any banking under the appearance of providing a thin 
and watery form of regulation. We overlooked wholly the one and 
great basic condition out of which all our banking troubles have 
grown, namely, that our banks had ceased to be primarily banks and 
had bee am© fueling companies in enterprises run not by bankers con­
cerned with operating banks, but by promoters whose object was to 
^ L. iiucker, A Short History of the Hew Deal (F. S. Cobb Co 
Bow, York, 1834) p. 50-21. 
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exploit the credit resources of the bank. And. then, to complete 
t e job at rambling legislation, thus brought together, v.e pro­
vided for a guarantee of deposits, leaving most of the ills of 
the banks untouched, but putting the public vilig&nee to sleep by 
proclaiming that while bankers ̂ ay to continue to inflict mortal 
-spurns upon the banks if they choose to do so, the public need not 
interest itself in the matter since it will be protected against 
(1) loss. v ' Ho over, the attempt at banking reform was success­
ful in improving the confidence of the American public in our 
banks. Whether or not the confidence is well placed in sound 
institutions remains to be seen. The immediate problem was solved 
but the ultimate problem remains a dark shadow in the future and 
must be solved before real banking recovery can take place. 
Horace Taylor, et. al.. Contemporary Problems, (liarcourt and 
Brace Co., New Yoric, 1S36) pp. 174-175. 
Chapter III 
IEFLATIOHAHY HEAS0S86 
The cost of relief work whether laadung or giving is tremen­
dous# Our Government found itself eanying on this typo of -work 
and therefore a need for large amounts of money. The price level 
was far below normal and the administration advisor belbrred "that 
the amount of money in circulation determines business activity and 
that a government con force soney Into circulation as it pleases 
and thus determine the price level as It desires." The monetary 
advisors of Roosevelt, George P. barren and Frank A. Pearson, 
have deemed that an inflationary program was necessary for the 
recovery from economic strain. * 
The pro; ram advocated by Tiarren and Pearson is not in harmony 
with the findings and theories of the leading economists of our 
prose t time. "An increase in the amount of money and credit 
in circulation, everything else retraining unchanged, should raise 
the price level. An increase In the rapidity of circulation 
(velocity) of money and oredit, other factors remaining the some 
should cause tie price level to rise. a similiar manner a 
decrease in the amount of goods and services sold, other factors 
remaining unchanged, should raise the price level. A reverse^ 
of thooe conditions should have an opposite effect upon the price 
level. 
But there are other considerations to be borne in mind. The 
price level is not always a passive factor or the mere resultant 
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of the other factors mentioned. Certain psychological conditions 
nay cause the price level to rise or fall more rapidly than changes 
in qua titles of purchasing power and of goods and services other— 
wise justify. If the mass of people believe that the chief indi­
cations point -to a rapid rise in the price level, they will tend 
to bid up prices more rapidly than is justified by the exchange 
relationship which would probably exist between the volume of 
circulating medium, on the one hand and goods and services on the 
ether, of the rise in the price level were not anticipated. In 
other wnrds tit© price level may be a cause as well as a rasultj 
it may be active as well as passive. The theory has been 
proven true, however, those theories given Roosevelt by barren 
and Pearson have not been in harmony with it. It is quite logical 
to think then, that the inflationary measures used by the adminis­
tration, in part hove not boon the best, or the monetary policies, 
but the measures used have alleviated the condition to cone ex­
tent and as the measures continue to worl they my prove mora use­
ful, this however is doubtful. 
A- DEPARTURE FROM T??E GOLD STANDARD 
One of the first steps taken by the President toward re­
lieving the pressure cm our monetary machinery was a departure 
from the gold standard. "A gold standard exists when gold has 
been adopted by a country as its standard metal, and when the 
^ alter E. Spahr, et. al». Economic Principles and Problems 
(Ferrer and ̂ Leahart, Inc., Hew York, 1934) Vol. I. p. 442. 
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units of value ere expressed in toms of gold, smd. idim the goM 
Is freely coined and Is all legal tender. It irsplles, also, tSmt 
all ot or xsonoy In th© country is mintoined at par udth gold, 
and that freedom of narrsaeBft of the ©old Into and out of the country 
is unrestricted except In so far as interest rules act as .tonodi— 
mccits in the freo novoncnt of the specie. ^ Bscsuae the gold 
standard taas thought to hare boon end probably is 13JO best nono-
tary standard* Our noneteury stan ards are expressed in Imw of 
nancy unite "which in noct promiling oeoaa&lc systeoo are spocio 
unite. All credit units are expressed In terns of the nanny or 
- standard unit* Every country oast adopt eaem unit of as&suro-
jaent, corxj standard by «ftich all mines will be r sac >r«d* In 
this country, for essartplo, as in most leading countries (except 
where these countries ham ta^orc.rily abandoned the old stan­
dard), the unit is in terms of gold. Our unit is the dollar of 
ISS/SI grains of old 0/l0. ^ Ihus me our nonetoxy unit de­
fined before the departure frcm t! o standard and & Ineetalng of 
t o gold content f our dollar* 
Because of the simplicity end oasc of lading our credit 
and no .ey in teres of gold standard, vsc had retained it until 
the out Doal*s inception* "JVelininrr stops indicated tret the 
t&sited States mo soon destined to go off the gold standard 
(1) IMW tV Doonomie Principles anil 
end Fdnelart, Inc., Ikw Yatk0 19S4) pp. 409"vol. 1. 
(2) Ibid, pp. 396* 
along with Host of the outstanding nations of the world. On Llarch 
10, 1933, the President issued an executive order to halt the ex­
port of gold oxcept w en licensed by the 'Treesuryj on April 15, 
the hoarding of gold coin, gold bullion and gold certificates was 
forbidden; and on April 19, the United States formliy departed 
from the gold standaed when an executive ordor stopped t! e free 
movement of tie metal. The document declared that tie earmarking 
for foreign account and tie export of gold, bullion gold, and 
gold certificates from t e United States was prohibited, She 
Secretary of tie Treasury was authorized to investigate, regulate 
or prohibited, and transactions in foreign exchange and the export 
or withdrawal of currency from the United States, To achieve the 
same result in a samesdiat different way the Gold Repeal Joint 
Resolution, approved June 5, 1933, cancelled the gold clause in 
all federal and private obligations and made contracts and debts 
payable in legal tender, ^ 
Thus did the Hew Deal Administration clear ti e path for the 
inception of any inflationary measures deemed necessary to recovery, 
B - THE AGRICULTURAL ADJUSTMENT ACT 
" As passed by Congress and a; proved by the President on Llay 
12, 1933, the Agricultural Adjustment A<«t, properly titled "An 
Act to relieve the Existing national Emergency by increasing 
(1) L, Hacker, The hone fairy Policies of the Hew Deal (F. S, Cobbe 
& Co,, lew York, 1935) pp,54. 
v 7f 
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i^ricultural Purchasing Power," contains bhree different parts# 
/ - \ * \ One part empowers tlie President, through the Secretary of 
Agriculture to increase agricultural purchasing power by raising 
farm income; another empowers the Fana Credit Administration to 
/ tqke measures to lighten the load of farm mortgages; the third 
4 giants to the President certain powers in regard to the national 
I currency and credit.^ It is the third part of the Act tliat 
/ i deals with the monetary policies and therefore our point of 
J H' • 
I intorest. 
'The Agricultural Adjust eat A t of May 12, 1933 embodied ItffJ 
/ 
the first positive efforts to increase the amount of money in 
circulation. It should be noted, however, that the Administra­
tion in this law won its initial battle to prevent inflation 
by statutory order, for the Act did not require tie President 
to carry out its terms but merely authorized him to do so "in 
his discretion." lie could undertake one r all of t o following 
in order to expand creditj (l) Require the Federal Reserve Banks 
to conduct open market operations, United States securities up 
to t: G value of 03,OCX),000,000.00. (2) Issue up to £3,000,000,000.00 
worth of United States notes. Ihis paper currency could be used 
by the government only in retioing outstanding Federal obliga­
tions, hut of course, It was to be legal tender for all public 
and private debts. (3) Reduce the gold content of the dollar as 
much as 53 per cent, and set up a bimetallic system a%d provide 
(1) The Agricultural Adjustment Act and its Operation (.The 
' Agricultural Adjustment Administration, TJashington, 1933) pp. 1. 
19. 
for the unlimited coinage of both gold and si Ivor at ratios fixed 
by him* (4) Accept for a period of six months, silver from 
foreign governments in payment of their indebtnoss to the United 
States at a price of not more than 50 per cent an ounce* However, 
not more than $200,000,000*00 worth of silver was to be taken on 
/ the account of t! e intergovernmental debts* ^ 
Insnodiately after the enactment of the measures or measure 
• 
there was a noticable rise in the price range of all commodities* 
The Hew Deal's action in relation to the relieving of pressure 
on the farmers seemed to have been successful* During the harvest 
season of 1933, when our farm products went to market prices again 
took a decided drop and once again the attention of the President 
and Congress turned to price fixing and monetary problems* The 
next step taken by the A(3ministration was the devaulation of the 
dollar as a relief measure* 
C - DOT JAP DgrAL'IATIOS 
The increasing rate of unrest due to the fall of prices 
during the harvest soason of 1933 spurred t o Administration to 
new activity* "To still the growing clamor of t? e inflationists 
the President on October 22 announced a new policy, the govern­
ment would purchase gold freshly mined in the United States and 
also (by announcement three days a tor) foreign gold, at figures 
to be determined by the Rp construction Finance Corporation* In 
this way a progressively cheaper value on the dollar would be sot* 
The immediate purpose of the device wore "to res ore the price 
level" and "to restore a balance in the price structure so tl at 
(1) I* hdc -cf, A b oft b'org of SR6 .,<M Deftl , (F. £>. fflbUB" 
f y  On. tWr ^*H»i ' m .  W J I.-WW • — 
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farmers may exchange their products for Hie products of industry 
on a farmer excaug© basisj the ultimate goal was to be the 
establishment and' raaSntewmce of "a dollar" which will not change 
its purchasing power nor debt paying power. 
The Reconstruction Finance Co poration at once began buying 
gold and continued the operation for a number of months j the 
dollar began to decline in relation to foreign currency} commodity 
prices, lioveyer did not rise correspondingly. Thus between 
October 25 and Larch 10, the dollar depriciated 6.8 per cent in 
foreign exchange, while the price of cotton advanced only 1.6 per 
cent. In the two weeks fror. October 24 to Eovemher 6, tie general 
level of wholesale commodity prices actually fell, according to 
t is weekly index of the Annalist from 103.8 to 103. Ttm Hew 
York Hues comment was pertinent} "Hie disparity between fee fall 
in e gold value of t c dollar, and the reagre advance in sensi­
tive prices on the speculative commodity and stock exchanges is 
raarlccd when it is recalled that prices should, in theory, show a 
percentage of advance greater than fee percentages of the fall 
of the dollar. By fee end of 1953 the net depreciation of the 
dol ar in terns of gold, amounted to 11.4 per cent. '1 *' 
The Administration was also faced with the issue of helping 
the silvo miners and hose wiio held silver interests. Their de-
oande could not be overlooked and the President in coalition vn th 
Congress passed the Silver Purchase Bill, the President expressed 
hope in fee various speeches and messages that ot or countries 
u- "• '"bfa 4 e°~ 
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would join in the romcnelisation of silver. Fay B» FesterfieId, 
Profess or of Political Economy at Yale University and Honorary 
Chairman of the Economist's Katicna Committee on Monetary Polices 
says In Ms hook, "Cur Silver Delete" -
"At test the President's ̂message ms nothing bettor then, a 
political surrender to or compromise with the active silver!tee 
and inflationists who had been besieging hin and throating hostile 
action by Congress. He had himself set the trap in TMOh hd was 
caught. He had made inflation a key policy of his administration. 
He lad promised higher prices and had indulged the gold mining 
interests with & 0 % increase in the prieo of gold. He had 
promised to ]ielp the farmer and the debtor by any and every in­
flationary device ii necessary. Silver speculations justifiably 
expected that he w uld do as well b; silver as he did by gold. 
Flier, the head of the nation adopts the policy of subsidising spoiial 
c las cos, it is difficult to stop short and deny highly organised 
politically active minorities their slice of public bacon. ow-
ever disillusioned he had become about the efficacy of gold pur­
chase and devaluation of raising the rice level (and curing the 
depression, he had to go on now and purchase silver and raise its 
price, even if he reslized it ms absurb and unjust. "Prom the 
picture painted it seems as the President and Congress were forced 
int. this particular policy and which ms advocated by them 'to 
bring aid to a particular group. Professor Westerfield continues -
"The Administration's Silver Purchase Bill was passed by 
Congress on June 11, 1934. Its provisions include the followingt 
22. 
1. It is declared to be the policy of the United States that 
the proportion of silver to gold in the monetary stocks of the 
United States shall be increases, with the ultimate objective of 
having and maintaining one-fourth of the monetary value of such 
stocks of silver* 
2* The Secretary 6f the Treasury is authorized and directed f* 
to buy silver at home and abroad at such rates, times, and terns 
as he dooms reasonable and most advantageous to the public interest. 
Such purchases are not to bo made at a price in excess of the xxme-
tary value (now 1.29 a f'ne ounce) and in the case of silver 
situated in the United States on lay 1, 1934, at a price exceed­
ing 50 cents a fine ounce. 
3. The Secretary of the Treasury, with the approval of the 
President, is authorized to soel silver acquired under the hat 
whenever the market price exceeds tie monetary value and the yevern-
mexit stock of silver exceeds 25% of the monetary stocks of old 
and silver, provided tint tho sales do not reduce te silver required 
as security for outstanding silver certificates. 
4. The Secretary of the Treasury is authorized and directed to 
issae silver certificates in an amount not loss than the cost of 
silver purchased, or, at tho discretion of the Secretary, in an 
amount equal to t e monetary values of the silver purchased, flic so 
and all ot er silver certificates are to be secured by silver 
f e 
bullion and silver coins having a monetary value (01.29) or rial to 
t e amount of th© certificates; they ar made a legal to: x and 
redeemable on demand in smniard silver dollars. 
5. The Secretary of the Treasury, with the approval of* t o 
3. 
President, is etnpowered to invest! a to, regulate or prohibit the 
acquisition, importation, ecxportation, or transportation of silver 
and to require re orts as to the facts involved* fhis authority 
may be exercised only when necessary to effectuate the policy of 
the law* 
6. Ihc President is aut orizod to require, by executive order, 
the delivery of silver to the stints regardless of who the owner or 
holder of the metal my be or rf orocrer in the United States the 
silver nay be situated. Silver withheld in violation of this pro­
vision is to be forfeited to the government and the person with­
holding the metal is to bo subject to a penalty equal to twice the 
monetary value of the silver. The silver so delivered is to be 
added to the monetary stocks and the T.eners are to receive the 
monetary value of the silver loss ti e deduction of such seigni­
orage as the President may determine to be fair, and the Treasury 
is to boor the cost of transportation and charges. 
7. The Stamp Act is amended to provide a transfer valued 50$ 
of the profits which result tram speculative activities in silver, 
the tax applies to transfers made on or after May 15, 1934. It 
applies to transfers to the United States Government except the 
transfers try deposits or delivery at a United States Mint (a) Under 
the President's Proclamation of Decanber 21, 1933, relating to the 
coinage of nearly mined domestic silver, and (b) in compliance with 
the provision of the silver purchase act. Which authorizes the 
President to require any and all silver to bo delivered to the 
mint. ̂  
Eras we have the import and isca,sures of Ei© Silver Purchase 
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Act which embodies the raon t' ry policy used by the ^dnunistr tion 
in regards to silver. And now that we have the administration's 
action taken toward gold and silver let us continue with its attempt 
at raising the price level by devaluation of the dollar.^) 
"Hie President's hope of raising prices by evaluating the 
dollar soon proved illusory. Indeed it was pointed out to him as 
early as Move? bar 16, 1933, by Professor 0. K. 8 >rague, that this 
confidence for recovery by this method did not have t e slig test 
relation to economic reality, is Professor Sprague m id, "'But r ore 
dap eciation of t e currency in relation to the currencies of other 
countries will ot bring about a general rise in prices." At a time 
when t ere is 1 rge excess plant capacity and millions of unemployed 
was e earners, an advance in prices that has any oro;;<ise of being 
maintained, requires ti e develop; ent of conditions that will permit 
a sustained de and for more later arid more materials, with resultant 
increase in the production of goods and services and a higher at ndard 
of living. ^ 
Hio above s atement by Professor Pprague was the co :ensu8 of 
opinions of all other leading monetary economists. The theories of 
Darren and Pearson - the theories of the New Deal - hni® been examined 
and proven to fail in hastening recovery. "Hie most vital >oint of conflict 
between the theories of Darren and those of the great majority of 
monetary economists is whether the problem of business recovery is a 
currency question as arren thinks, or whether, as a at ant I orities 
believe, it is a question of enabling the producer to reau me his 
(1) Louis Hacker, A Short History of The New Deal. 3. Job us, Co., 
New York, 1935) PP. 57-58 
(2) Ibid , p. 58. 
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activities, after iiich the necessary currency will flow into circula­
tion. I'onotary experts hold that business cannot be revived in a 
sound manner until business men have reduced the r inventories to a 
noxr&l or satisfactory level and have lowered the r costs below 
selling prices; tnat the amount of money in circulation is ater­
rain ed rimarily by such business activity and does not cause it; 
th t there is no sound ,:ay to force money in circulation with the ex­
pectation that it will revive business when business isai are not 
borrowing or using their bank deposits; and that there is no nown 
way, which is sound, to increase consumer purchasing power by manipu-
1 ting tie currency, for the reason that consumer purchasing power, 
with a few minor ex options, is derived from the activities f 
producers, in short, monetary economists hold th t busi ess re­
covery is generated by changing our currency system, onetary 
economists maintain that the currency in circulation is merely the the-
moraatlar recording the state of business, whereas arren apparently 
supposes that he can change the health of business by changing the 
seals on the thermometer by destroying the thermometer. 
"he monetary theories held by arren and Pearson, uersonal 
advisors of the Administration, therefore the Hew Deal's policies 
are in direct contrast to the theories held by Professor Dprague, 
-pahr a d other leading monetary economists. "Never-the-less, the 
President peraervered in his course. On /ecenber 21, anting on the 
autuoritygiven him by the Agricultural Adjustment Act, cited above, 
President Roosevelt ordered the treasury during the next few years to 
buy all the silver mined in the United States - corning to approximately 
24,000,000 ounces annually - at 64g- cents an ounce. (This was 21a cents 
above the market level on the day in question}, un January 15, 1934, 
haa asked to enact a measure which would directly allow the dollar 
devaluation, ""he new bill was to give the resident power, (1) to fix 
r 
the limits for devaluation of the dollar at from 50 to 60 cants in 
tarns of gold content, (2) to authorize him to manage t e dollar within 
these limits of its old gold content, by changing, or making such 
ohances in its value as he deemed neeeaBaryj (3) To impound in the 
Treasury the vast stocks of gold held by the rederal Reserve Banks; 
(4) i'o assure to t e government whatever profit mi ht result from an 
increase in the value of t is metal; and (5) To use part of this 
profit to create a fund of #2,000,000,000.00 which to stabalize the 
dollar. 
Congress immediately complied the hill was carried by both 
houses a d signed January 30, and two days later Roosevelt fixed the 
value of t e dollar at 59.06 cents in terns of its old purity. The 
value of t e maneuver as a price fixing or raising device stood as 
follows; From Atpril 19, 19l33, when the gold standard had been abandoned 
to Jay 1, 1934, the wholesale price commodity index of 174 com: odities 
as compiled by the Departent of labor rose 22 p r cent, in the same 
period, the gold content of the dollar was reduced 41 per cent, it 
w s inevitable therefore, that the administration should yeild before 
the gpoiing pressure of the inflationists, particularly the Gilverites. 
Though the monetary theories of the ew Deal have seemed to hinge on 
inflation, however v rious authorities answer differently as to the 
(1}. JL. acker, A 3hort istory of the new Deal, r. Cob »s & Co. 
R w 
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prospect of Inflation. Said Professor James Hnrvey Sogers of Yale 
University, "I rake a very definite answer therefore to the prospect 
of inflation. It is directly dependent upon the control of the 
nationil budget, if a balance within the next few years can be 
definitely provided for a d clearly Ibrseen, the spectre of tin-
controlled inflation can be dismissed. If, on the other and, future 
approaches to a ell-ordered and gradually balancing ach asthe one 
recently roooaed t Congress are to receive the disrupting treatment 
given that one, the prospect of inflation is very grave indeed. 
"It was budgeted difficulties that produced all the post-war 
inflation in 3urope. If we have inflation, it will be because our 
budget gets out df oontrol. I think therefore, the problem of the 
prospect of inflation can be reduced to these terms," -
With the advice nd opinions of such eminent economists as 
Professor iiprague, iipahr, Hogers, whether directly or indirectly, 
and the direct advice of Tarren and Pearson, the rogram of the 
?tew Deal moves on. Inflation has not been allowed to run it, nor 
has the general public suffered as a result of the raonet&ry policies 
now in practice. Then these theories were >ut in practice an emergency 
held sway and radical immediate action was necessary, oo with due 
credit to the administration's advisors and their ideas, m can say 
that they have worked. 
Chapter IV. 
Conclusion 
Sow that the monetary policies of' the Lew Deal imve been 
in operation let us "take a brief survey of the condition of our 
monetary standing or reactions to the: as a result of these policies. 
"In one of the most important monetary acts since devaluation 
. 
of the dollar, the Treasury revealed plans today to concentrate 
•<-
control of currency in the Federal/ Government. 
A plan to strip national banks of their power to issue money 
and call in national bank notes to be replaced by Federal Reserve 
notes tss announced by acting Secretary of the Treasury, Thomas 
Jefferson Collidge. 
The Federal Government as a part of the program will draw on 
its gold devaluation profits to retice #674,625,030.00 of tiro 
5 
national debt. Tire maneuver will save the Government $3,QQO$OQO 
annually in interest. 
Trie bonds to be reticed beer "Circulation" privileges are 
! * 
pledged by national banks with the Treasury to back most of the 
$557,937.080.00 ef outstanding bank notes. 
The Sew Federal Reserve Hotes will be backed by gold of not 
I 
less than 40 per cert of their face value. Use national bank notes 
to be called in this summer are backed 100 per cent by Government 
bonds pledged with the treasury by the issuing banks. The immediate 
effect will be simplification of the nations currency system and 
vesting in the Treasury and the Federal Reserve Banks all authority 
to issue money* 
By calling the "circulation11 privilege bonds and allowing this 
privilege on other bonds to expire in July, the Government will de­
prive national banks of t e right to issue money, a practice they 
have engaged in profitably since the Civil War* 
The plan m said to carry definite monetary inflation impli­
cations in that it represents a spending of the Government's gold 
profit and widens the gold base to support potential expansion* 
Offieials avoided reference to inflation possibilities, but 
conceded it would "pit gold to work, which can be expanded#" 
They pointed out complete control over issua ces of money is placed 
in the hands of the Federal Government for the first time as a con­
trolling safegaurd over possible expansion* 
Government officials said the move was anot. or stop in the 
simplification of the monetary system and a vesting of complete 
power over issuance of money in the bands of the Federal Government*^) 
These then, have been some of the results of the Sew Deal's 
monetary policies, and they seem satisfactory, in that they allow 
for possible expansion of our currency but with a possible control 
over such expansion. Let us take a look at some of tlx© coci ents 
by some of our leading monetary economists* 
Professor Edwin Miter Kesamerer, monetary and banking authority 
writing in the Hew York Sun, said that the use of a portion of the 
^The Hew York Sun, March 11, 1935. 
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dollar devaluation profit to extinguish circulation bonds as "the 
best my to avoid inflation.11 To the extent that the effect of 
the plan is to replace national bank notes with other f'oras of 
money. Professor Kemmerer declared, it would be merely "one 
hand washing the other.8 
"If the Treasury were issuing more gold certificates, without 
at ti e same time forcing the retirement of almost as much other 
money,8 he continued "there would be a net expansion of currency. 
So long as a portion of the gold profit remained unallocated 
this expansion was possible at any time and, in fact, to a sin 11 
degree it has been happening.8 Dr. Kemmerer, referred to the 
deposit of gold certificates issued against small portions of 
the free gold and deposited from time to time in the Treasury's 
checking account in the Federal He serve banks. Summing up Dr. 
Keraaerer observed that so far as the present announced intention 
of the treasury was concerned, he saw nothing dangerous or irv-
faltionary in it.8 ̂  
Another monetary authority, an economists for a large hall 
Street bank, declared in his opinion that the Treasury's a nounco-
aent was a "good move," chiefly because 8it buries tie gold profit 
where inflationists and spenders can't get it.8 Furthermore, he 
declared it displayed a commendable attitude on the part of the 
Treasury as to the disposition of the revaluation profit and it 
also revealved a degree of monetary knowlege that was refreshing. 
To the extent that the amount of bonds to be redeemed exceeded the 
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circulation issued against tfeeaa, this economist oo tinned bank 
reserves would be inilated• He added that if other forms of 
Government bonds temporarily bearing the circulation privileges 
lost that privilege in July through the Home Loan Bank Bill accord-
ing circulation collateral value, the banks would ave to put up 
the cash to replace the cash now used for its security# 
Elimination of so large an amount of Government securities 
from the assets of tie banks, together with the slight addition 
to their excess re serveswhich the operation will produce is calcu­
lated to induce the banks to buy more Government issues to replace 
at least a portion of the securities which are being "called# To 
that extent the elimination of old circulation bonds may indirectly 
hold future debt refunding possibilities# 
Indirect advantages which the Treasury will receive are several# 
The reminder of the profit arising from dollar devaluation aside 
from the portion already set aside in the stabilisation fund will 
have been used# This will render impossible the earmarking of 
portiors of the gold profit for other projects, such as, for in­
stance, a soldier bonus, unless prevision is made to take the money 
out of t e stabilisation fund or from other Government cash resources#" 
Said Professor Irving Fisher, Yale economists and monetary 
exrert about the action taken by the Treasury -
"The plan seems as excellent one for which I have hoped 
for sometime," he said# "The chief use of devaluation 
should bo increasing the numbers of dollars in gold 
by decreasing the weight of the dollar# The number 
of dollars thus created by decreasing their weight was 
2.8 billinos, but hither to these additional gold dollars 
lave been kept in the Treasury# 
I have no doubt That any undue inflation will be avoided, as 
I an sure the administration has no intention of an thing more than 
the mild reflation necessary to recovery# 
Professor Fisher saw three advantages in the Treasury's move -
First through involving a relatively snail sum, he felt'it 
would have a stimulating effect because it gave notice that the 
President's original premise to restore our lost circulating 
medium# 
Second, it will lighten the Government's burden of debt# 
Third, it will work toward unification of the currency system# 
He says the method as controlled reflation rather than uftcon-
tr oiled inflation# Hie President could reverse this procedure, 
he said, by issuing bonds for gold, then by keeping control#"(1) 
Still another economist and former executive to the Secretary 
of the Treasury, said "that the Gover,.client's plan to utilize the 
$ 42f000,000#00 of its profit from devaluation of the dollar to 
retice some of its bonds, indicated confidence on the part of the 
Treasury to hadle future bond financing# 
I had supposed the gold poof it would be held for Government 
bonds in case they are weak#" Dr. Spra;?ue said, the plan so cms 
to indicate the confidence on the part of the Treasury to handle 
future financing of bonds#" 
Hie plan to eliminate the national bank currency and replace 
^ The liew York Cua> March 11, 1935# 
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it with Federal Reserve notes was termed "of no groat importance 
by Dr. Sprague." 
Dr. Sprague said he did not believe the plan would lead to 
inflation of any sort.* ^ 
Thus do the various leading monetary economists repress them­
selves about some of the policies advocated by the adrainistrarion. 
Inflation pure and single has rust been used as a poliey yet, Ihs 
partial inflation 1ms been kept under control and by careful farther 
r anipulation of our currency uncontrolled inflation can be avoided. 
Further agreement of the Hew Deal recovery program is voiced by 
wr 
another monetary specialist, "E onamic recovery is making rapid 
strides in every country save a few. I believe its full attainment 
to be impossible without monetary stabilization at heme and abroad. 
I believe that once monetary stabilisation is readied in and be­
tween the principal nations of the earth, a period of pronounced 
prosperity will ensue j and I equally believe that in order to 
preserve that new prosperity and to avert the recurrence of fresh 
disaster, the leading nations nust work together in the monetary 
field in an endeavor so to regulate and coordinate their credit 
policy that undue fluctuations in usiness activity with the atten­
dant sharp variations in price levels, fluctuations which are 
attributable to monetary causes, nay be studied and kept in check.(2) 
Wft. T rk S,n. It "#• 
( 2 )  
Rusrel Lef^ingwell, Proceedin 2 of the Academy of Political Science, 
Economic R covory TWrnc-frnry • Vol. yVTI. 
ho. 1. pg? 93. 
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And it is toward monetary stabilization that the monetary 
policies of the Hew D©al declare working. Other nations are 
working toward the sane thing and by cooperation it is expected 
that new monetary standards for international trade will be set 
up. Optimism on the part of monetary economists in the united 
States is representative of most of tie producers, ith minor 
returns being carried on in the banking system and a new note of 
confidence in the Treasury department complete recover should 
become a. reality. 
Such has been some of the major monetary policies of the 
New Deal and the results derived therefrom. Recovery from 
i 
depression is not complete because of- discrepancies in, net 
only the monetary policies, but other steps taken, by the Govern­
ment toward recovery. By continued efforts to improve the policies 
already in practice and their evolution into new ones, the Hew 
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